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Abstract. Most multi-party computation protocols allow secure com-
putation of arithmetic circuits over a finite field, such as the integers
modulo a prime. In the more natural setting of integer computations
modulo 2k, which are useful for simplifying implementations and appli-
cations, no solutions with active security are known unless the majority
of the participants are honest.
We present a new scheme for information-theoretic MACs that are
homomorphic modulo 2k, and are as efficient as the well-known standard
solutions that are homomorphic over fields. We apply this to construct
an MPC protocol for dishonest majority in the preprocessing model that
has efficiency comparable to the well-known SPDZ protocol (Damg˚ard
et al., CRYPTO 2012), with operations modulo 2k instead of over a field.
We also construct a matching preprocessing protocol based on oblivious
transfer, which is in the style of the MASCOT protocol (Keller et al.,
CCS 2016) and almost as efficient.
1 Introduction
In the context of secure multi-party computation (MPC) there are n parties
P1, . . . , Pn who want to compute a function f : Rn → Rn securely on an input
(x1, . . . , xn), where each party Pi holds xi, without revealing the inputs to each
other and only by exchanging messages between them. The main security guar-
antee we would like to achieve is that at the end of the interaction each party Pi
only learns xi and the i-th component of f(x1, . . . , xn), and nothing else. This
should hold even if an adversary corrupts some of the parties and, in case of
active or malicious corruption, takes control of the corrupted parties and have
them do what the adversary wants. These ideas are formalized by requiring that
using the protocol should be essentially equivalent to having a trusted third party
compute the function. For such a formalization see, for example, the Universal
Composability Framework (UC) [4].
It is well known that the hardest case to handle efficiently is the dishonest
majority case, where t ≥ n/2 parties are actively corrupted. Here we cannot
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guarantee that the protocol terminates correctly, and we have to use computa-
tionally heavy public-key technology — unconditional security is not possible in
this scenario. However, in a recent line of work [2,9], it was observed that we
can push the use of public-key tools into a preprocessing phase, where one does
not need to know the inputs or even the function to be computed. This phase
produces “raw material” (correlated randomness) that can be used later in an
online phase to compute the function much more efficiently and with uncondi-
tional security (given the correlated randomness).
In all existing protocols that handle a dishonest majority and active corrup-
tions, the function being computed must be expressed in terms of arithmetic
operations (i.e. additions and multiplications) over a finite field, such as the
integers modulo a prime. However, in many applications one would like to use
numbers modulo some M that is chosen by the application and is not necessarily
a prime. In particular, M = 2k is interesting because computation modulo 2k
matches closely what happens on standard CPUs and hence protocol designers
can take advantage of the tricks found in this domain. For instance, functions
containing comparisons and bitwise operations are typically easier to implement
using arithmetic modulo 2k; these kinds of operations are expensive to emulate
with finite field arithmetic, and also very common in applications of MPC such as
secure benchmarking based on linear programming [6]. This has been done suc-
cessfully by the team behind the Sharemind suite of protocols [3], which allows
bitwise operations and integer arithmetic mod 232. However, in their basic set-
ting, they could only get a passively secure solution: here, even corrupt players
are assumed to follow the protocol. Also, the security of Sharemind completely
breaks down if half (or more) of the players are corrupted, and the efficiency
does not scale well beyond three parties.
To obtain active security over fields, the main idea of modern protocols is
to use unconditionally secure message authentication codes (MACs) to prevent
players from lying about the data they are given in the preprocessing phase.
A typical example is the SPDZ protocol [7,9], where security reduces to the
following game: we have a data value x, a random MAC key α and a MAC
m = αx, all in some finite field F. The adversary is given x but not α or αx.
He may now specify errors to be added to x, α and m, and we let x′, α′,m′ be
the resulting values. The adversary wins if x = x′ and m′ = α′x′. It is easy to
see that the adversary must guess α to win, and so the probability of winning is
1/|F|. This authentication scheme is additively homomorphic, which is exploited
heavily in the SPDZ protocol and is crucial for its efficiency.
However, the security proof depends on the fact that any non-zero value in F
is invertible, and it is easy to see that if we replace the field by a ring, say Z2k ,
then the adversary can cheat with large probability. For instance, in the ring
Z2k he can choose x′ = x + 2k−1 and cheat with probability 1/2. Up to now, it
has been an open problem to design a homomorphic authentication scheme that
would work over Z2k or more generally ZM for any M , and is as efficient as the
SPDZ scheme.
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1.1 Our Contributions
In this paper we solve the above question: we design a new additively homomor-
phic authentication scheme that works in Z2k1, and is as efficient as the standard
solution over a field. The main idea is to choose the MAC key α randomly in
Z2s , where s is the security parameter, and compute the MAC αx in Z2k+s . We
explain below why this helps. We also design a method for checking large batches
of MACs with a communication complexity that does not depend on the size of
the batch. We believe that these techniques will be of independent interest.
We then use the MAC scheme to design a SPDZ-style online protocol that
securely computes an arithmetic circuit over Z2k with statistical security, assum-
ing access to a preprocessing functionality that outputs multiplication triples in
a suitable format. The total computational work done is dominated by O(|C|n)
elementary operations in the ring Z2k+s , where C is the circuit to be computed.
So if k ≥ s, the work needed per player is equal to the work needed to compute
C in the clear, up to a constant factor — as is the case for the SPDZ protocol.
As in other protocols from this line of work, the overhead becomes more sig-
nificant when k is small. Each player stores data from the preprocessing of size
O(|C|(k+ s)) bits. However, the communication complexity is O(|C|k) bits plus
an overhead that does not depend on C. This is due to the batch-checking of
MACs mentioned above.
Our final result is an implementation of the preprocessing functionality to
generate multiplication triples. It has communication complexity O((k+s)2) bits
per multiplication gate, and is roughly as efficient as the MASCOT protocol [14],
which is the state of the art for preprocessing over a field using oblivious transfer.
Concretely, our triple generation protocol has around twice the communication
cost of MASCOT, due to the overhead incurred when we have to work over
larger rings in certain scenarios. However, this additional cost seems like a small
price to pay for the potential benefits to applications from working modulo 2k
instead of in a field.
1.2 Overview of Our Techniques
For the authentication scheme, as mentioned, we have a data item x ∈ Z2k+s , a
key α ∈ Z2k+s and we define the MAC as m = αx mod 2k+s. Note that we want
to authenticate k-bit values, so although x ∈ Z2k+s , only the least significant
k bits matter. The adversary is given x, and specifies errors ex, eα, em, which
define modified values x′ = x + ex, α′ = α + eα,m′ = m + em. He wins if
m′ = α′x′ mod 2k+s, but note that since we store data in the least significant
k bits only, this is only a forgery if ex mod 2k = 0. As we show in detail in
Sect. 3, if the adversary wins, he is able to compute exα mod 2k+s. From this,
and ex mod 2k = 0, it follows that the adversary can effectively guess α mod 2s,
which is only possible with probability 2−s.
We also want to batch-check many MACs using only a small amount of com-
munication. The SPDZ protocol [9] uses a method that basically takes a random
1 We use modulus 2k throughout, but the scheme easily extends to any modulus.
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linear combination of all messages and MACs and checks only the resulting mes-
sage and MAC. Unfortunately, applying the analysis we just sketched to this
scenario does not give a negligible probability of cheating, unless we ‘lift’ again
and compute MACs modulo 2k+2s, but then our storage and preprocessing costs
would become significantly bigger. We provide a more complicated but tighter
analysis showing that we can still compute MACs mod 2k+s and the batch
checking works with 2−s+log s error probability, so we only need increase s by a
few bits.
Using these MACs, we can create an information-theoretically secure MPC
protocol over Z2k in the preprocessing model, similar to the online phase of
SPDZ from [7]. To implement the preprocessing phase, we follow the style of
MASCOT [14], which uses oblivious transfer to produce shares of authenticated
multiplication triples. We first design a protocol for authenticating values using
correlated oblivious transfer, which allows creating the secret-shared MACs that
will be added to the preprocessing data. This stage is similar to MASCOT,
whereby first a passively secure protocol is used to compute shares of the MACs
αxi, for each value xi that is to be authenticated, and then a random linear
combination of these values is opened, and the resulting MAC checked for cor-
rectness. The main change we need to make here is that, depending on the size
of the xi’s being authenticated, we may need to first compute the MACs over a
larger ring in order to apply our analysis of taking random linear combinations.
Once the authentication scheme has been implemented, the main task is
to create the multiplication triples needed in the online phase of our proto-
col. For this we also follow a similar approach to MASCOT, where the overall
idea is that each party Pi chooses its shares (ai, bi) and then is engaged in
an oblivious transfer subprotocol with Pj for each j = i, where shares of the
cross products aibj and ajbi are obtained. This yields shares of the product
(
∑n
i=1 a
i)(
∑n
j=1 b
j) =
∑n
i=1 a
ibi +
∑
i=j(a
ibj + ajbi), as required. Behind this
simplification lies the problem that some information about the honest parties’
shares can be leaked to a cheating adversary. In MASCOT this potential leakage
is mitigated by “spreading out” the randomness by taking random linear combi-
nations on correlated triples (with the same b value). When working over fields,
the inner product yields a 2-universal hash function so the new distribution can
be argued to be close to uniform using the Leftover Hash Lemma. However, this
is not true anymore over rings like Z2k . We overcome this issue by starting with
triples where the shares of a are bits instead of ring elements, and then taking
linear combinations over the bits. These combinations correspond to a subset
sum over Z2k , which is a 2-universal hash function, so allows for removing the
leakage.
Additionally, random combinations are used in MASCOT to check the cor-
rectness of a triple by “sacrificing” another one. The security argument is that
if the adversary manages to authenticate an incorrect triple, then it will have to
guess the randomness used in the sacrifice step, which is unlikely. This is argued
by deriving an equation from which we can solve for the random value. In order
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to extend this argument to the ring case, we use the technique sketched at the
beginning of this section, working over Z2k+s to check correctness modulo 2k.
Organization of this document. Section 2 introduces the notation we will use
throughout this document. It also introduces the oblivious transfer and coin toss-
ing functionalities, FROT and FRand, which constitute our most basic building
blocks and will be used to implement the offline phase of our protocol. We then
describe our information-theoretic MAC scheme in Sect. 3, and we show how to
check correctness of several authenticated values assuming a functionality FMAC
that generates keys and MACs. Next, in Sect. 4 we show how to use our scheme
to realise the functionality FOnline, i.e. to evaluate securely any arithmetic circuit
modulo 2k, in the preprocessing model.
The next two sections are concerned with the implementation of the pre-
processing functionality FPrep. Section 5 deals with the implementation of the
functionality FMAC, i.e. the distribution of the MAC key and the generation of
MACs. Our construction is based on a primitive called vector Oblivious Linear
Function Evaluation (FvOLE). This can be implemented using Correlated Obliv-
ious Transfer (FΔ-OT), which as we mention in that section can be implemented
using our basic primitive FROT. On the other hand, Sect. 6 builds on top of our
MAC scheme and generates multiplication triples that will be used during the
online phase of our protocol to evaluate multiplication gates. Finally, in Sect. 7
we provide an efficiency analysis of our protocol.
Related work. There are only a few previous works that study MPC over
rings, and none of these offer security against an active adversary who corrupts
a dishonest majority of the parties. Cramer et al. showed how to contruct actively
secure MPC over black-box rings [5] using secret-sharing techniques for honest
majority, but this is only a feasibility result and the concrete efficiency is not
clear. As already mentioned, Sharemind [3] allows mixing of secure computation
over the integers modulo 2k with boolean computations, but is restricted to
the three-party setting when at most one party is corrupted. In some settings
Sharemind can also provide active security [18].
More recently, Damg˚ard, Orlandi and Simkin [8] present a compiler that
transforms a semi-honest secure protocol for t corruptions into a maliciously
secure protocol that is secure against a smaller number of corruptions (approx-
imately
√
t). This also works for protocols in the preprocessing model, but will
always result in a protocol for honest majority, so they can tolerate a smaller
number of corruptions. On the other hand, their compiler is perfectly secure, so
it introduces no overhead that depends on the security parameter. Thus, their
results are incomparable to ours.
2 Preliminaries
Notation. We denote by ZM the set of integers x such that 0 ≤ x ≤ M − 1.
The congruence x ≡ y mod 2k will be abbreviated as x ≡k y. We let x mod M
denote the remainder of x when divided by M , and we take this representative
774 R. Cramer et al.
as an element of the set ZM . Given two vectors x and y of the same dimensions,
x ∗ y denotes their component-wise product, 〈x ,y〉 denotes their dot product
and x [i] denotes the i-th entry of x .
2.1 Oblivious Transfer and Coin Tossing Functionalities
We use a standard functionality for oblivious transfer on random -bit strings,
shown in Fig. 1. This can be efficiently realised using OT extension techniques
with an amortized cost of κ bits per random OT, where κ is a computational
security parameter [13]. We use the notation FτROT to denote τ parallel copies of
FROT functionalities.
Functionality FROT
On input (Sender, Pj , ) from Pj and (Receiver, b, Pi) from Pi, the functionality
samples random values r0, r1 ←R Z2 , then sends (r0, r1) to Pj and rb to Pi.
If Pj is corrupted then the functionality instead allows the adversary to choose
(r0, r1) before sending rb to Pi.
Fig. 1. Random Oblivious Transfer functionality between a sender and receiver
We also use a coin tossing functionality, which on input (Rand) from all
parties, sample r ←R R and output r to all parties. This can be implemented
in the random oracle model by having each party Pi first commit to a random
seed si with H(i‖si), then opening all commitments and using
⊕
i si as a seed
to sample from R.
3 Information-Theoretic MAC Scheme
In this section we introduce our secret-shared, information-theoretic message
authentication scheme. This forms the backbone of our MPC protocol over Z2k .
The scheme has two parameters, k, where 2k is the size of the ring in which
computations are performed, and a security parameter s. In the MAC scheme
itself and the online phase of our MPC protocol there is no restriction on k,
whilst in the preprocessing phase k also affects security.
There is a single, global key α =
∑
i α
i mod 2k+s, where each party holds
a random additive share αi ∈ Z2s . For every authenticated, secret value x ∈
Z2k , the parties will have additive shares on this value over the larger ring
modulo 2k+s, namely shares xi ∈ Z2k+s such that x′ =
∑
i x
i mod 2k+s and
x ≡k x′. The parties will also have additive shares modulo 2k+s of the MAC
m = α · x′ mod 2k+s. We will denote this representation by [x], so we have:
[x] =
(
xi,mi, αi
)n
i=1
∈ (Z2k+s × Z2k+s × Z2s)n ,
∑
i
mi ≡k+s
( ∑
i
xi
) · (
∑
i
αi
)
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Notice that if the parties have [x] and [y], then it is straightforward to obtain
by means of local operations [x + y], [c · x] and [x + c], where the arithmetic is
modulo 2k+s and c is a constant. We state the procedures that allow the parties
to do this in Fig. 2.
Procedure AffineComb
This procedure allows the parties to compute authenticated shares of y = c+c1 ·x1+
· · · + ct · xt mod 2k+s given c, c1, . . . , ct, [x1], . . . , [xt]. The input to this procedure
are the constants c, c1, . . . , ct ∈ Z2k+s , the shares of the values {xji}ti=1, the shares
of the MACs {mji}ti=1, owned by each party Pj , and the shares of the MAC key
{αj}j .
1. Party P1 sets y1 = c + c1 · x11 + · · · + ct · x1t mod 2k+s;
2. Each party Pj , j = 1, sets yj = c1 · xj1 + · · · + ct · xjt mod 2k+s;
3. Each party Pj sets mj = αj · c + c1 · mj1 + · · · + ct · mjt mod 2k+s.
At the end of the procedure {yj}j are additive shares of y modulo 2k+s and {mj}j
are shares of α · y mod 2k+s, the MAC of y. To simplify the exposition, we write
[c + c1 · x1 + · · · + ct · xt] = c + c1 · [x1] + · · · + ct · [xt]
whenever this procedure is called.
Fig. 2. Procedure for obtaining authenticated shares of affine combinations of shared
values
In Fig. 3 we define the functionality FMAC, which acts as a trusted dealer
who samples and distributes shares of the MAC key, and creates secret-shared
MACs of additively shared values input by the parties. As with previous works,
it allows corrupt parties to choose their own shares instead of sampling them at
random, since our protocols allow the adversary to influence the distribution of
these. We will show how to implement this functionality in Sect. 5.
3.1 Opening Values and Checking MACs
Given an authenticated sharing [x], a natural (but insufficient) approach to open-
ing and reconstructing x is for each party to first broadcast the share xi and
then compute x′ =
∑
i x
i mod 2k+s. The parties can then check the MAC rela-
tion x′ · α without revealing the key α using the method from [7]. Although
this method guarantees integrity of the opened result modulo 2k (by the same
argument sketched in the introduction), it does not suffice for privacy when
accounting for the fact that x may be a result of applying linear combinations
on other private inputs. For example, suppose x = y + z for some previous
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Functionality FMAC
The functionality generates shares of a global MAC key and, on input shares of a
value, distributes shares of a tag of this value. Let A be the set of corrupted parties
and s be a security parameter.
Initialize: On receiving (Init) from all parties, sample random values αj ←R Z2s
for j /∈ A and receive shares αj ∈ Z2s , for j ∈ A, from the adversary. Store the
MAC key α =
∑n
j=1 α
j (over Z) and output αj to party Pj .
Macro Auth(, x1, . . . , xn) (this is an internal subroutine only)
1. Let x =
∑n
j=1 x
j mod 2 and m = α · x mod 2
2. Wait for input {mj}j∈A from the adversary and sample {mj}j /∈A at random
conditioned on m ≡
∑n
j=1 m
j . Output (m1, . . . ,mn).
Authentication: On input (MAC, , r, {xji}ti=1) from each party Pj , where xji ∈
Z2r and  ≥ r:
1. Wait for the adversary to send messages (guess, j, Sj), for every j /∈ A,
where Sj efficiently describes a subset of {0, 1}s. If αj ∈ Sj for all j then
send (success) to A. Otherwise, send ⊥ to all parties and abort.
2. Execute Auth(, x1i , . . . , x
n
i ) for i = 1, . . . , t, and then wait for the adversary
to send either OK or Abort. If the adversary sends OK then send the MAC
shares mji ∈ Z2 to party Pj , otherwise abort.
Fig. 3. Functionality for generating shares of global MAC key, distributing shares of
inputs and tags
inputs y, z. When opening x modulo 2k+s, although for correctness we only care
about the lower k bits of x, to verify the MAC relation we have to reveal the
entire shares modulo 2k+s. This leaks whether or not the sum y + z overflowed
modulo 2k.
To prevent this leakage we use an authenticated, random s-bit mask to hide
the upper s bits of x when opening. The complete protocol for doing this is
shown below.
Procedure SingleCheck([x]):
1. Generate a random, shared value [r] using FMAC, where r ∈ Z2s
2. Compute [y] = [x + 2kr]
3. Each party broadcasts their shares yi and reconstructs y =
∑
i y
i mod 2k+s
4. Pi commits to zi = mi − y · αi mod 2k+s, where mi is the MAC share on y
5. All parties open their commitments and check that
∑
i z
i ≡k+s 0
6. If the check passes then output y mod 2k
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Claim 1. If the MAC check passes then y ≡k x, except with probability at
most 2−s.
Proof. Suppose a corrupted party opens [y] to some y′ = y + δ, where δ ∈ Z2k+s
can be chosen by A, and δ ≡k 0. To pass the MAC check, they must also come
up with an additive error Δ in the committed values zi such that
∑
i z
i + Δ is
zero modulo 2k+s. This simplifies to finding Δ ∈ Z2k+s such that
∑
i
(mi − (x + δ) · αi) + Δ ≡k+s 0
⇔ δ · α ≡k+s −Δ
Let v be the largest integer such that 2v divides δ, and note that because
δ ≡k 0 we have v < k. This means that we can divide the above by 2v, reducing
the modulus from 2k+s to 2k+s−v accordingly:
δ
2v
· α ≡k+s−v − Δ2v
By definition of v, δ2v must be an odd integer, hence invertible modulo 2
k+s−v.
Multiply by its inverse gives
α ≡k+s−v − Δ2v ·
(
δ
2v
)−1
Note that k + s − v > s, since v < k, which implies that A must have guessed
α mod 2s to come up with δ and Δ which pass the check. This requires guessing
the s least significant bits of α, which are uniformly random, so the probability
of success is at most 2−s. unionsq
3.2 Batch MAC Checking with Random Linear Combinations
The method described in the previous section allows the parties to open and then
check one shared value [x]. However, in our MPC protocol many such values will
be opened, and using the previous method to check each one of these would have
the drawback that we need shared, authenticated random masks for each value to
be opened, consuming a lot of additional preprocessing data.2 In order to avoid
this, we present a batch MAC checking procedure for opening and checking t
shared values [x1], . . . , [xt], which uses just one random mask to check the whole
batch.
Technically speaking, our main contribution here is a new analysis of the
distribution of random linear combinations of adversarially chosen errors modulo
2k, when lifting these combinations to the larger ring Z2k+s . If we naively apply
the analysis from Claim 1 to this case, then we would have to lift to an even
bigger ring Z2k+2s to prove security, adding extra overhead when creating and
2 Note that in previous SPDZ-like protocols these extra masks are not needed.
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Procedure BatchCheck
Procedure for opening and checking the MACs on t shared values [x1], . . . , [xt].
Let xji ,m
j
i , α
j be Pj ’s share, MAC share and MAC key share for [xi].
Open phase:
1. Each party Pj broadcasts for each i the value x˜ji = x
j
i mod 2
k.
2. The parties compute x˜i =
∑n
j=1 x˜
j
i mod 2
k+s.
MAC check phase:
3. The parties call FRand(Zt2s) to sample public random values χ1, . . . , χt ∈ Z2s
and then compute y˜ =
∑t
i=1 χi · x˜i mod 2k+s.
4. Each party Pj samples rj ←R Z2s , and then calls FMAC on input (s, s, rj ,MAC)
to obtain [r]. Denote Pj ’s MAC share on r by j .
5. Each party Pj computes pj =
∑t
i=1 χi · pji mod 2s where pji =
x
j
i −x˜
j
i
2k and
broadcasts p˜j = pj + rj mod 2s.
6. Parties compute p˜ =
∑n
j=1 p˜
j mod 2s.
7. Each party Pj computes mj =
∑t
i=1 χi · mji mod 2k+s and zj = mj − αj · y˜ −
2k · p˜ · αj +2k · j mod 2k+s. Then it commits to zj , and then all parties open
their commitments.
8. Finally, the parties verify that
∑n
j=1 z
j ≡k+s 0. If the check passes then the
parties accept the values x˜i mod 2k, otherwise they abort.
Fig. 4. Procedure for checking a batch of MACs
storing the MACs. With our more careful analysis in Lemma 1 below, we can
still work over Z2k+s and obtain failure probability around 2−s+log s, which gives
a significant saving.
Suppose the parties wish to open [x1], . . . , [xt], hence learn the values
x1, . . . , xt modulo 2k. Denote the shares, MAC shares and MAC key share held
by Pj as x
j
i ,m
j
i , α
j respectively. To initially open the values, the parties simply
broadcast their shares x˜ji = x
j
i mod 2
k and reconstruct x˜i =
∑
j x˜
j
i (as before,
we cannot send the upper s bits of xji for privacy reasons). As the parties do
not have MACs on the values modulo 2k, these s dropped bits will have to be
used at some point during the MAC check, by adding them back in to the linear
combination of MACs being checked. Crucially, by postponing the use of these
s bits until the MAC check phase, our protocol only needs one authenticated
random value to mask them, instead of t. The procedure that achieves this is
described in Fig. 4, and its guarantees are stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Suppose that the inputs [x1], . . . , [xt] to the BatchCheck procedure
are consistent sharings of x1, . . . , xt under the MAC key α =
∑
i α
i mod 2s,
and the honest parties’ shares αj ∈ Z2s are uniformly random in the view of
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an adversary corrupting at most n − 1 parties. Then, if the procedure does not
abort, the values x˜i accepted by the parties satisfy xi ≡k x˜i with probability at
least 1 − 2−s+log(s+1).
The following lemma will be used in the proof of this theorem. The lemma
is very general, which will allow us to use it also when we prove the security of
the preprocessing phase of our protocol. However, in the current context, this
lemma will be used with  = k+ s, r = k and m = s, and the δ’s can be thought
of as the errors introduced by the adversary during the opening phases.
Lemma 1. Let , r and m be positive integers such that  − r ≤ m. Let
δ0, δ1, . . . , δt ∈ Z, and suppose that not all the δi’s are zero modulo 2r, for i > 0.
Let Y be a probability distribution on Z. Then, if the distribution Y is indepen-
dent from the uniform distribution sampling α below, we have
Pr
α,χ1,...,χt←RZ2m ,
y←RY
[
α ·
(
δ0 +
t∑
i=1
χi · δi
)
≡ y
]
≤ 2−+r+log(−r+1),
Proof. Define S := δ0+
∑t
i=1 χi ·δi, and define E to be the event that α ·S ≡ y.
Let W be the random variable defined as min(, e), where 2e is the largest power
of two dividing S. We will use the following claims.
Proposition 1.
i. Pr[E | W = r + c] ≤ 2−(−r−c) for any c ∈ {1, . . . ,  − r}
ii. Pr[E | 0 ≤ W ≤ r] ≤ 2−(−r)
iii. Pr[W = r + c] ≤ 2−c for any c ∈ {1, . . . ,  − r}
Proof. For the first part, suppose that 0 < c <  − r (the case c =  − r is
trivial), in particular, w = r + c is the largest exponent such that 2w divides
S and therefore S/2w is an odd integer. From the definitions of E and w we
have that E holds if and only if α · S ≡ y, which in turn is equivalent to
α · S2w ≡−w y2w and therefore to α ≡−w y2w ·
(
S
2w
)−1
Since α is uniformly
random in Z2m and independent of the right-hand side, and also  − w < m
(as r < w and  − r ≤ m), we conclude that the event holds with probability
2−(−w) = 2−(−r−c), conditioned on W = r + c.
Similarly, if 0 ≤ w ≤ r then  − w ≥  − r and so α ≡−r y2w ·
(
S
2w
)−1
. As
 − r ≤ m, the event holds with probability at most 2−(−r) if conditioned on
0 ≤ W ≤ r. This proves the second part.
For the third part, we must also look at the randomness from the χi coef-
ficients. Suppose without loss of generality that δt is non-zero modulo 2r, and
suppose that W = r + c some 1 ≤ c ≤  − r. Since 2W |S, we have S ≡r+c 0,
and so
χt · δt ≡r+c −δ0 −
∑
i=t
χi · δi
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=S′
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Let 2v be the largest power of two dividing δt, and note that by assumption we
have v < r so r + c − v > c. Therefore,
χt · δt2v ≡r+c−v
S′
2v
χt ≡r+c−v S
′
2v
(
δt
2v
)−1
χt ≡c S
′
2v
(
δt
2v
)−1
By the same argument as previously, and from the fact that c ≤  − r ≤ m, this
holds with probability 2−c, over the randomness of χt ←R Z2m , as required.
Putting things together, we apply the law of total probability over all possible
values of w, obtaining:
Pr[E] = Pr[E | 0 ≤ W ≤ r] · Pr[0 ≤ W ≤ r] +
−r∑
c=1
Pr[E | W = r + c] · Pr[W = r + c]
≤ 2−+r · 1 +
−r∑
c=1
2−+r+c · 2−c = 2−+r +
−r∑
c=1
2−+r
= ( − r + 1) · 2−+r ≤ 2−+r+log(−r+1)
where the first inequality comes from applying item ii of Proposition 1 on the
left, and items i and iii on the right. unionsq
Now we proceed with the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof (of Theorem 1). We first assume that A sends no Key Query messages
to FMAC, and later discuss how the claim still holds when this is not the case.
First of all notice that if no error is introduced by the adversary, then the
check passes. Now, let y =
∑t
i=1 χi · xi mod 2s+k, pi =
∑n
j=1 p
j
i mod 2
s and
p =
∑n
j=1 p
j mod 2s. If all parties followed the protocol then the following chain
of congruences holds
n∑
j=1
zj ≡k+s
n∑
j=1
mj − y˜ ·
n∑
j=1
αj − 2k · p˜ ·
n∑
j=1
αj + 2k ·
n∑
j=1
j
≡k+s α · y − α · y˜ − α · 2k · p˜ + 2k · α · r
≡k+s α · (y − y˜ − 2k · (p˜ − r))
≡k+s α · (y − y˜ − 2k · p)
≡k+s α ·
t∑
i=1
χi ·
(
xi − x˜i − 2kpi
) ≡k+s 0
where the last equality holds due to the fact that for all i = 1, . . . , t we have
xi = x˜i + 2k · pi.
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Now, consider the case in which the adversary does not open correctly to x˜i
and p˜ in the execution of the procedure. Let x˜i+δi mod 2k+s and p˜+	 mod 2s
be the values opened in steps 1 and 5 respectively, so the value computed in
step 3 is equal to y˜′ = y˜ + δ mod 2k+s, where δ =
∑t
i=1 χi · δi mod 2k+s. As a
consequence, the share that an honest Pj should open in step 7 is zj−αj ·(δ+2k	)
mod 2k+s. However, the adversary can open this value plus some errors that sum
up to a value Δ ∈ Z2k+s . If the check passes, this means that
0 ≡k+s
n∑
j=1
(
zj − αj · (δ + 2k	)) + Δ ⇔ α · (δ + 2k	) ≡k+s Δ.
Suppose that for some index it holds that δi ≡k 0. By setting δ0 = 2k	,
 = k + s, r = k, m = s and Y to be the distribution of Δ produced by the
adversary, we observe we are in the same setting as the hypothesis of Lemma 1.
This allows us to conclude that the probability that the check passes is bounded
by 2−+r+log(−r+1) = 2−s+log(s+1).
Handling key queries. We now show that this probability is the same for an
adversary who makes some successful queries to an honest party’s αj using the
(guess) command of FMAC. Let S be the set of possible keys guessed by A (if
there is more than one query then we take S to be the intersection of all sets).
The probability that all these queries are successful is no more than |S|/2s, and
conditioned on this event, the min-entropy of the honest party’s key share is
reduced to log|S| ≤ s. Therefore, instead of success probability 2−s+log(s+1) as
above, the overall probability of A performing successful key queries and passing
the check is bounded by
|S|/2s · 2− log|S|+log(log|S|+1) = 2−s+log(log|S|+1) ≤ 2−s+log(s+1)
as required. unionsq
4 Online Phase
Our protocol is divided in two phases, a preprocessing phase and an online phase.
The preprocessing, which is independent of each party’s input, implements a func-
tionality FPrep which generates the necessary shared, authenticated values needed
to compute the given function securely. This functionality is stated in Fig. 5.
The main difference, with respect to SPDZ, is that instead of generating the
random input masks and multiplication triples over the same space as the inputs,
we sample them over Z2k+s , even though we are doing computations in Z2k . In
the input phase, this is necessary to mask the parties’ input whilst also obtaining
a correct MAC over Z2k+s . For the triples, we sample the shares and compute the
MACs in Z2k+s , but only care about correctness of the multiplication modulo
2k, so the upper s bits of a triple are just random.3
3 These s bits are not actually required to be random, since whenever we open a value
using BatchCheck the upper s bits of all shares are masked anyway. However, it
simplifies the description of the functionality to use random shares.
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Modulo these differences, the online phase of our protocol, shown in Fig. 7,
is similar to that in other secret sharing-based protocols like GMW, BeDOZa,
SPDZ and MASCOT [2,9,11,14].
Shares of the inputs are distributed by means of the random shares provided
by FPrep. When an addition gate is found, the parties obtain the output by
Functionality FPrep
The preprocessing functionality has all the same features as FMAC, with the addi-
tional commands:
Input: On input (Input, Pi) from all parties, do the following:
1. Sample a random value r ∈ Z2k+s and generate random shares r =
∑n
j=1 r
j
mod 2k+s. If Pi is corrupted, instead let the adversary choose all shares rj
and compute r accordingly.
2. Run the Auth macro to generate shares and MAC shares of [r].
3. Send r to Pi, and the relevant shares of [r] to each party.
Triple: On input (Triple) from all parties, the functionality performs the following
steps
1. Sample random shares {(aj , bj)}j /∈A ⊆ (Z2k+s)2
2. Wait for input {(aj , bj , cj)}j∈A ⊆ (Z2k+s)3 from the adversary and set
c = a · b mod 2k, where a =∑nj=1 aj mod 2k and b =∑nj=1 bj mod 2k.
3. Sample {cj}j /∈A ⊆ Z2k+s and r ∈ Z2s subject to c + 2kr ≡k+s
∑n
j=1 c
j .
4. Finally, the functionality runs the Auth macro to generate sharings
[a], [b], [c] and sends the j-th output of each result to party Pj .
Fig. 5. Functionality for the preprocessing phase
Functionality FOnline
Initialization: The functionality receives input (Init, k) from all parties.
Input: On input (Input, Pi, vid, x) from party Pi and input (Input, Pi) from the
other parties, where vid is a fresh, valid identifier, the functionality stores
(vid, x mod 2k).
Add: On input (add, vid1, vid2, vid3) from all parties, the functionality retrieves
(if present in memory) the values (vid1, x1), (vid2, x2) and stores (vid3, x1 +
x2 mod 2k).
Multiply: On input (multiply, vid1, vid2, vid3) from all parties, the functionality
retrieves (if present in memory) the values (vid1, x1), (vid2, x2) and stores
(vid3, x1 · x2 mod 2k).
Output: On input (output, vid) from all honest parties, the functionality looks for
(vid, y) in memory and if present, sends y to the adversary. The functionality
then waits for a message Abort or Proceed from the adversary: if it sends Abort
then the functionality aborts, otherwise the value y is delivered to all parties.
Fig. 6. Ideal functionality for the online phase
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Protocol ΠOnline
The protocol is parameterized by k, which specifies the word size on which the
operations are to be performed, and a security parameter s.
Initialize: The parties call the functionality FPrep as follows:
1. On input (Init) to get MAC key shares αj ∈ Z2s .
2. On input (Input, Pi) for all parties to obtain random sharings [r] where Pi
learns r, for every input that Pi will provide.
3. On input (Triple) to get enough triples ([a], [b], [c]).
Input: To share an input xi held by Pi:
1. Pi broadcasts  = xi − r mod 2k+s, where [r] is the next unused input
mask.
2. The parties compute [xi] = [r] + .
Add: To add two values [x] and [y] the parties compute locally [z] = [x] + [y].
Multiply: To multiply two values [x] and [y]:
1. Open [x] − [a] as  and [y] − [b] as δ using the Open phase of BatchCheck,
where ([a], [b], [c]) is the next unused triple.
2. Locally compute [x · y] = [c] +  · [b] + δ · [a] +  · δ.
Output: To output a value [y]:
1. Call the procedure BatchCheck to check the MACs on the values that have
been opened so far in multiplications.
2. If this does not abort, the parties open and check the MAC on [y] using
the procedure SingleCheck from Section 3.1.
Fig. 7. Protocol for reactive secure multi-party computation over Z2k
adding their shares locally. On the other hand, multiplication triples are used
for the multiplication gates, where the fact that x · y = c + 	 · b + δ · a + 	 · δ
for c = a · b, 	 = x − a and δ = y − b allows us to evaluate multiplications
as affine operations on x and y, once the values of 	 and δ are known. Finally,
after checking correctness of all the values opened in multiplications using the
batch MAC checking procedure from Sect. 3, the values for the output wires are
revealed (Fig. 6).
The proof of the following theorem is quite straightforward, given the analysis
of the MACs in Sect. 3.
Theorem 2. The protocol ΠOnline implements FOnline in the FPrep-hybrid model,
with statistical security parameter s.
5 Preprocessing: Creating the MACs
We now show how to authenticate additively shared values with the linear MAC
scheme, realising the functionality FMAC from Sect. 3 (Fig. 3). Recall that after
sampling shares of the MAC key α ∈ Z2s , the functionality takes as input secret-
shared values x ∈ Z2r , and produces shares of the MAC x ·α mod 2. The input
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and output widths r and  are parameters with  ≥ r. In our protocol we actually
require  ≥ 2s and  ≥ r + s, where s is the security parameter, but if these
do not hold then we work with ′ = max(r + s, 2s) and reduce the outputs
modulo 2.
Building block: vector oblivious linear function evaluation. To create the
MACs, we will use a functionality for random vector oblivious linear function
evaluation (vector-OLE) over the integers modulo 2. This is a protocol between
two parties, PA and PB, that takes as input a fixed element α ∈ Z2s from party
PA, a vector x from party PB, then samples a random vector b ∈ Z2 as output
to PB , and sends a = b + α · x mod 2 to PA. In the specification of our ideal
functionality in Fig. 8, x is a vector of length t + 1, with the first t components
from Z2r and the final component from Z2 . This is because our MAC generation
protocol will create a batch of t MACs at once on r-bit elements, but to do this
securely we also need to authenticate an additional random mask of  bits.
Notice that the functionality also allows a corrupted PB to try to guess a
subset of Z2s in which α lies, but if the guess is incorrect the protocol aborts.
This is needed in order to efficiently implement FvOLE using oblivious transfer on
correlated messages, based on existing oblivious transfer extension techniques.
Functionality FsvOLE
Initialize: On receiving (sid, Init, α) from PA, where α ∈ Z2s , and (sid, Init) from
PB , store α and ignore any subsequent (sid, Init) messages.
Vector-OLE: On input (sid, , r, t,x) from PB , where x ∈ Zt2r × Z2 :
1. Sample b ←R Zt+12 . If PB is corrupted, instead receive b from A.
2. Compute a = b+ α · x mod 2
3. If PA is corrupted, receive a ∈ Zt2 from A and recompute b = a− α · x.
4. If PB is corrupted, wait for A to input a message (guess, S), where S
efficiently describes a subset of {0, 1}s. If α ∈ S then send (success) to A.
Otherwise, send ⊥ to both parties and terminate.
5. Output a to PA and b to PB .
Fig. 8. Random vector oblivious linear function evaluation functionality over Z2k+s
MAC generation protocol. Each party samples a random MAC key share αi,
and uses this to initialize an instance of FvOLE with every other party. On input
a vector of additive secret shares x i = (xi1, . . . , x
i
t) from every Pi, each party
samples a random ′-bit mask xit+1, and then uses FvOLE to compute two-party
secret-sharings of the products αi · (x j‖xjt+1) for all j = i. Each party can then
obtain a share of the MACs α · x (where α = ∑αi and x = ∑x i), by adding
up all the two-party sharings together with the product αi · x i.
So far, the protocol is only passively secure, since there is nothing to prevent
a corrupt Pj from using inconsistent values of αj or x j with two different honest
parties, so the corrupt parties’ inputs may not be well-defined. To prevent this
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issue, and ensure that in the security proof the simulator can correctly extract
the adversary’s inputs, we add a consistency check in steps 6–11: this challenges
the parties to open a random linear combination of all authenticated values. This
is where we need the additional random mask xt+1, to prevent any leakage on
the parties inputs from opening this linear combination. The check does not rule
out all possible deviations in the protocol, however, in what follows we show that
it ensures that the sum of all the errors directed towards any given honest party
is zero, so these errors all cancel out. Intuitively, this suffices to realise FMAC
because the functionality only adds a MAC to the sum of all parties’ inputs, and
not the individual shares themselves (Fig. 9).
Protocol ΠAuth
Initialize: Each party Pi samples a MAC key share αi ←R Z2s . Every pair of
parties (Pi, Pj) initializes an instance of FvOLE, where Pi inputs αi.
Authentication: To authenticate the values x = (x1, . . . , xt) over Z2 , where
each party Pj inputs an additive share xj ∈ Zt2r :
1. Let ′ = max(, r + s, 2s).
2. Each party Pj samples a random mask xjt+1 ←R Z2′ and defines x˜j :=
(xj , xjt+1) ∈ Zt2r × Z2′ .
3. Every pair (Pi, Pj) (for i = j) calls their FvOLE instance with input
(′, r, t, x˜j) from Pj .
4. Pj receives bj,i and Pi receives ai,j , such that ai,j = bj,i +αi · x˜j mod 2′ .
5. For h = 1, . . . , t + 1, each party Pj defines the MAC share
mjh = α
j · xjh +
∑
i=j
(aj,i − bj,i)[h] mod 2′
Consistency check:
6. Sample χ1, . . . , χt ←R Zt2s using FRand.
7. Each party Pj computes and broadcasts xˆj =
∑t
i=1 x
j
i ·χi +xjt+1 mod 2
′
.
8. Each party Pj defines mˆj =
∑t
h=1 m
j
h ·χh +mjt+1 mod 2
′
and xˆ =
∑
i xˆ
i.
9. Each party Pj commits to and then opens zj = mˆj − xˆ · αj mod 2′ .
10. All parties check that
∑
i z
i = 0 mod 2
′
and abort if the check fails.
11. Each party Pj outputs the MAC shares mj1, . . . ,m
j
t mod 2
.
Fig. 9. Protocol for authenticating secret-shared values
5.1 Security
We now analyse the consistency check of the MAC creation protocol. There are
two main types of deviations that a corrupt Pj can perform, namely (1) Input
inconsistent values of αj to the initialization phase of FvOLE with different honest
parties, and (2) Input inconsistent shares x j in the authentication stage.
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For both types of errors, we define the correct values αj ,x j to be those used
in the FvOLE instance with an arbitrary, fixed honest party, say Pi0 . We then
define the errors
γj,i = αj,i − αj and δj,i = x j,i − x j ,
for each j ∈ A and i /∈ A. For an honest party Pi, we also define αi,j ,x i,j to be
equal to αi,x i for all j = i.
In Claims 2 and 3 below we will show that, if the consistency check passes,
then with overwhelming probability the sum of all corrupted parties’ values
is well-defined. That is, the values
∑
j∈A α
j and
∑
j∈A x
j would be exactly
same even if they were defined using the inputs from Pj with a different hon-
est party Pi1 = Pi0 . Since the MACs are computed based only on the sum
of the MAC key shares and input shares, this suffices to prove security of the
protocol.
Suppose that the corrupted parties compute the MAC shares mj as an honest
Pj would, using the values αj ,x j we defined above, as well as the values aj,i, bj,i
sent to FvOLE. Note that even though a corrupt Pj need not do this, any deviation
here can be modelled by an additive error in the commitment to zj in step 9, so
we do not lose any generality.
The sum of the vector of MAC shares on x is then given by
∑
i
m i =
∑
i
αi · x i +
∑
i
∑
j =i
(a i,j − bj,i)
=
∑
i
αi · x i +
∑
i
∑
j =i
αi,j · x j,i)
= α · x +
∑
i/∈A
x i ·
∑
j∈A
γj,i
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=γi
+
∑
i/∈A
αi ·
∑
j∈A
δj,i
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=δi
After taking random linear combinations with the vector χ = (χ1, . . . , χt) to
compute the MAC on xˆ, these MAC shares satisfy
∑
i
mˆi = α · xˆ +
∑
i/∈A
(〈x i,χ〉 + xit+1) · γi +
∑
i/∈A
αi · 〈δj ,χ〉 (1)
To pass the consistency check, the adversary must first open the random
linear combination xˆ to some (possibly incorrect) value, say xˆ + ε, in step 7.
Then they must come up with an error Δ ∈ Z2′ such that
0 ≡′
∑
i
zi + Δ
≡′
∑
i
(mi − (xˆ + ε) · αi) + Δ
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⇔ −Δ ≡′
∑
i
mi − (xˆ + ε) · α
≡′ α · ε +
∑
i/∈A
(〈x i,χ〉 + xit+1)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=ui
·γi +
∑
i/∈A
αi · 〈δj ,χ〉
−Δ −
∑
j∈A
αj · ε ≡′
∑
i/∈A
ui · γi +
∑
i/∈A
αi · (〈δj ,χ〉 + δjt+1 + ε)
where the last two congruences come from substituting (1) and moving infor-
mation known by the adversary to the left-hand side.
When proving the two claims below we assume that the adversary does not
send any (guess) messages to FvOLE. Similarly to the proof of Theorem 1, these
can easily be extended to handle this case.
Claim 2. If at least one γi = 0 then the probability of passing the check is no
more than 2−s+log n.
Proof. Let i be an index for where γi = 0. Recall that γi = ∑j /∈A γj,i, where
each γj,i < 2s, therefore γi < 2s+log n. Note that the distribution of ui is uniform
in Z2′ and independent of all other terms, due to the extra mask x
i
t+1, so we
can write ui · γi ≡′ Δ′, for some Δ′ that is independent of ui. Dividing by 2v,
the largest power of two dividing γi, we get
ui · γ
i
2v
≡′−v Δ
′
2v
ui ≡′−v Δ
′
2v
·
(
γi
2v
)−1
Since v < s + log n, this holds with probability at most 2−
′+s+logn ≤ 2−s+logn
since ′ ≥ 2s.
Claim 3. Suppose γi = 0 for all i /∈ A, and δj is non-zero modulo 2k in at least
one component for some j. Then, the probability of passing the check is no more
than 2−s+log(
′−r+1).
Proof. Pick an honest party, say Pi0 , and similarly to the previous claim, we can
write the equivalence as
αi0 · (〈δi,χ〉 + δit+1 + ε) ≡′ Δ′
for some Δ′ that is independent of the honest party’s MAC key share αi0 . We
can then apply Lemma 1 with r = r,m = s,  = ′ and δ0 = δit+1 + ε to obtain
the bound 2−
′+r+log(′−r+1), which proves the claim since ′ ≥ r + s.
The above two claims show that, except with negligible probability in s and r,
the sum of all errors directed towards any given honest party is zero, so all errors
introduced by corrupt parties cancel out and the outputs form a correct MAC
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on the underlying shared value. In particular, for the security proof, this implies
that in the ideal world the MAC shares seen by the environment (including those
of honest parties’) are identically distributed to the MAC shares output in the
real world.
We have the following theorem.
Theorem 3. The protocol ΠAuth securely realises FMAC in the (FvOLE,FRand)-
hybrid model.
6 Preprocessing: Creating Multiplication Triples
In this section we focus on developing a protocol that implements the Triple
command in the preprocessing functionality. More precisely, let FTriple be the
functionality that has the same features as FPrep (Fig. 5), but without the Input
command. Our protocol, described in Fig. 10, implements the functionality FTriple
in the (FROT,FMAC,FRand)-hybrid model (Fig. 11).
The protocol itself is very similar to the one used in MASCOT [14], with
several changes introduced in order to cope with the fact that our ring Z2k has
non-invertible elements. Most of these changes involve taking the coefficients of
random linear combinations in a different ring Z2s , which is useful to argue that
certain equations of the form r ·a ≡k+s b are satisfied with low probability. This
can be seen for example in the sacrifice step, where the random value t is chosen
to have at least s random bits, instead of k. Additionally, in our protocol (like
in MASCOT) random linear combinations must be used to extract randomness
from partially leaked values a1, . . . , at, which still have reasonably high entropy.
In order to use the Leftover Hash Lemma in this context one needs to make
sure that taking random linear combinations yields a universal hash function.
However, in contrast to the field case it is not true in general that the function
r1 ·a1+ · · ·+ rt ·at mod 2k is universal, unless we make some assumptions about
the set the values ai are picked from. In the case of our protocol, we force the
ai to be −1, 0 or 1. With this additional condition it can be shown that the
function above is universal.
The Multiply phase generates shares {(a i, bi, ci)}ni=1 such that Pi has
(a i, bi, ci), where a i is a vector of bits, bi is a random element of Z2k+s and
ci is a vector of random elements of Z2k+s . These values satisfy c = a · b, where
c =
∑n
i=1 c
i mod 2k+s, a =
∑n
i=1 a
i mod 2k+s and b =
∑n
i=1 b
i mod 2k+s. This
is achieved by letting the parties choose their shares on a and b, and using obliv-
ious transfer to compute the cross products a i · bj . However, this is not a fully
functional multiplication triple yet as it might not satisfy the right multiplica-
tive relation (besides other technical issues like a being a short vector, and not
a value in Z2k+s). To check that the triple is correct, the Sacrifice phase uses
another triple to check correctness. As the name suggests, one triple is “sacri-
ficed” (i.e. opened) so that we can check correctness of the other while keeping
it secret.
On the other hand, we must also ensure that the triple looks random to all
parties. As we will see shortly in the proof of Theorem 4, if the triple is correct
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Protocol ΠTriple
The integer parameter τ = 4s + 2k specifies the size of the input triple used to
generate each output triple.
Multiply:
1. Each party Pi samples ai = (ai1, . . . , aiτ ) ←R (Z2)τ , bi ←R Z2k+s
2. Every ordered pair of parties (Pi, Pj) does the following:
(a) Both parties call FτROT with Pi as the receiver and Pj as the sender. Pi
inputs the bits (ai1, . . . , aiτ ) ∈ (Z2)τ .
(b) Pj receives qj,i0,h, q
j,i
1,h ∈ Z2k+s and Pi receives si,jh = qj,iai
h
,h
for h =
1, . . . , τ .
(c) Pj sends dj,ih = q
j,i
0,h − qj,i1,h + bj mod 2k+s, for h = 1, . . . , τ .
(d) Pi sets ti,jh = s
i,j
h + a
i
h · dj,ij mod 2k+s for h = 1, . . . , τ . In particular
ti,jh ≡k+s si,jh + aih · dj,ij
≡k+s qj,iai
h
,h
+ aih ·
(
qj,i0,h − qj,i1,h + bj
)
≡k+s qj,i0,h + aihbj .
Therefore, the following equation holds modulo 2k+s on each entry
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
ti,j1
ti,j2
...
ti,jτ
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
qj,i0,1
qj,i0,2
...
qj,i0,τ
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠+ bj
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
ai1
ai2
...
aiτ
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠
(e) Pi sets cii,j = t
i,j
1 , t
i,j
2 , . . . , t
i,j
τ
) ∈ (Z2k+s)τ .
(f) Pj sets cji,j = − qj,i0,1, qj,i0,2, . . . , qj,i0,τ
) ∈ (Z2k+s)τ .
(g) The following congruence holds
cii,j + c
j
i,j ≡k+s ai · bj ,
where the modulo congruence is component-wise.
3. Each party Pi computes:
ci = ai · bi +
∑
j =i
(cii,j + c
i
j,i) mod 2
k+s
Fig. 10. Triple generation protocol
this will reveal some partial information about the honest parties’ shares to the
adversary. This means that the adversary can guess a particular bit of these
shares, which would allow him to distinguish in the simulation. This issue is
addressed by the step Combine, which takes place before the Sacrifice step.
Here the parties take a random linear combination of a . Now, in order to pass
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Protocol ΠTriple (continuation)
Combine:
1. Sample r, rˆ ←R FRand ((Z2k+s)τ ).
2. Each party Pi sets
ai =
τ∑
h=1
rha
i[h] mod 2k+s, ci =
τ∑
h=1
rhc
i[h] mod 2k+s and
aˆi =
τ∑
h=1
rˆha
i[h] mod 2k+s, cˆi =
τ∑
h=1
rˆhc
i[h] mod 2k+s
Authenticate: Each party Pi runs FMAC on their shares to obtain authenticated
shares [a], [b], [c], [aˆ], [cˆ].
Sacrifice: Check correctness of the triple ([a], [b], [c]) by sacrificing [aˆ], [cˆ].
1. Sample t := FRand (Z2s).
2. Execute the procedure AffineComb to compute [ρ] = t · [a] − [aˆ]
3. Execute the procedure BatchCheck on [ρ] to obtain ρ.
4. Execute the procedure AffineComb to compute [σ] = t · [c] − [cˆ] − [b] · ρ.
5. Run BatchCheck on [σ] to obtain σ, and abort if this value is not zero
modulo 2k+s.
Output: Generate using FMAC a random value [r] with r ∈ Z2s . Output
([a], [b], [c + 2kr]) as a valid triple.
Fig. 11. Triple generation protocol (continuation)
the check, the adversary has to guess a random combination of the bits of a ,
which is much harder.
At this point a triple ([a], [b], [c]) has been created, with c ≡k a · b. However,
the s most significant bits of c have some information that could allow the
adversary to guess the shares of a of the honest parties. Moreover, correctness
of the triple is only required modulo 2k, as this is the modulus in the circuit the
parties want to compute. Therefore, in order to mitigate this issue the parties use
a random authenticated mask to hide the s most significant bits of c. This mask is
very similar to the one used in the procedure SingleCheck from Sect. 3.1. In fact,
in an actual implementation we could ignore the mask on the triples, as these
will be masked before opening in the MAC checking procedures. However, if we
wish to apply the Composition Theorem to our final protocol, each subprotocol
must be UC secure by itself, regardless of any further composition.
Now we proceed with the main theorem of the section, which states the
security of the protocol in Fig. 10.
Theorem 4. If τ ≥ 4k + 2s, then the protocol ΠTriple (Fig. 10) securely
implements FTriple in the (FROT,FMAC,FRand)-hybrid model, with statistical
security parameter k.
Proof. Let Z be an environment, which we also refer to as adversary, corrupting
a set A of at most n − 1 parties. We construct a simulator S that has access
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to the ideal functionality FTriple and interacts with Z in such a way that the
real interaction and the simulated interaction are indistinguishable to Z. Our
simulator S proceeds as follows:
Simulating the Multiply phase. The simulator emulates the functionality
FτROT and sends qj,i0,h, qj,i1,h ∈ Z2k for h ∈ {1, . . . , τ} to every j ∈ A (on behalf
of each honest party Pi). When a corrupted party Pj sends d
j,i
h to an honest
party Pi, h ∈ {1, . . . , τ}, the simulator uses its knowledge on the q’s to extract
the values of b used by the adversary as bjh = d
j,i
h −qj,i0,h +qj,i1,h mod 2k (notice
that if all the parties were honest we would have that all bjh for h ∈ {1, . . . , τ}
are equal, however, the adversary can take any strategy and this may not
be the case here). The simulator then emulates the multiplication procedure
according to the protocol using a fixed consistent value bj for each j ∈ A (say
the value of bj1 used with a fixed honest party Pi0). We let b
j,i ∈ (Z2k+s)τ
denote the vector of values of b that Pj tried to use in interaction with the
emulated honest party Pi in step (c) and we define δb = bj,i − bj (modulo
2k+s on each entry) where bj is the vector (bj , . . . , bj).
In a similar way, we define δj,ia = a
j,i − aj where aj = aj,i0 (these are the
errors introduced by Pj when interacting with Pi with respect to the values
used in the interaction with Pi0) and a
j,i is the vector that the corrupt party
Pj used in the random OT when interacting with honest party Pi. Notice
that δj,ia ∈ {−1, 0, 1}τ .
Simulating the Combining phase. All the computations are local, so S just
emulates FRand and proceeds according to the protocol.
Simulating the Authentication phase. Now S emulates FMAC with inputs
from the corrupt parties provided by Z. Notice that S can compute the actual
values that each corrupt party should authenticate. The simulator authenti-
cates these and defines eAuth and eˆAuth to be the total error introduced by
the adversary in this step. Note that here eAuth, eˆAuth = 0 essentially means
that the adversary authenticates values different from those computed in the
previous phases. If Z sends Abort to FMAC then S sends Abort to FTriple.
Simulating the Sacrifice step. The simulator opens a uniform value in Z2k+s
as the value of ρ, and aborts if the triple that it has internally stored is
incorrect modulo 2k. Otherwise it stores this triple as a valid triple.
Now we argue that the environment Z cannot distinguish between the hybrid
execution and the simulated one. We begin by noticing that in the Multiply
phase the adversary only learns the mask di,jh for each i ∈ A, but they look
perfectly random as the values qi,j
1−ajh,h
are uniformly random and never revealed
to Z. On the other hand, we still need to argue that the value ρ during the
Sacrifice step has indistinguishable distributions in both executions, and that
the triple ([a], [b], [c]) obtained in the real execution is indistinguishable from the
triple generated in the ideal execution (where a and b are uniformly random).
In order to analyze these distributions, we study what is the effect of the
adversarial behavior in the final shared value c, and we do this by considering
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what happens in the real execution at the end of step 2 when executed by a
pair of parties (Pi, Pj). If both j and i are honest, then the vectors cii,j and c
j
i,j
computed at the end of the execution satisfy cii,j + c
j
i,j ≡k+s a i · bj . Also, if j
and i are both corrupt then we can safely assume that cii,j + c
j
i,j ≡k+s a i · bj
also holds, since any variation on this will result in an additive error term which
depends only in adversarial values and therefore it will get absorbed by the
authentication phase. Now suppose that j is corrupt and i is honest, then Pi
uses a i and Pj uses bj,i, so the vectors cii,j and c
j
i,j computed at the end of the
execution satisfy
cii,j + c
j
i,j ≡k+s a i · bj,i ≡k+s a i · δj,ib + a i · bj .
Similarly, if i is corrupt and j is honest, then Pi uses a i,j and Pj uses bj , so the
vectors cii,j and c
j
i,j computed at the end of the execution satisfy
cii,j + c
j
i,j ≡k+s a i,j · bj ≡k+s δi,ja · bj + a i · bj .
Now, if ci is the vector obtained by party Pi at the end of the multiplication,
then we have that
c ≡k+s a · b +
∑
i/∈A
a i ∗ δib
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ea
+
∑
j /∈A
δja · bj
︸ ︷︷ ︸
eb
where a =
∑n
i=1 a
i, b =
∑n
i=1 b
i, δib =
∑
j∈A δ
j,i
b and δ
j
a =
∑
i∈A δ
i,j
a , and all
congruences are considered component-wise. Notice that each entry in δja is the
sum of at most n bits and therefore it is upper bounded strictly by n, since
we assume that n  2k+s we can consider the sum a = ∑ni=1 a i (without the
modulus).
Assume all parties (including corrupt ones) take the right linear combination
in the combine phase (every adversarial misbehavior will result in an additive
error term that only depends on values that the adversary has, and this term
will be absorbed by the error term in the authentication phase). Therefore, after
the combination and authentication phases the parties obtain values [b], [a], [c],
[aˆ], [cˆ] where b, a, c, aˆ, cˆ ∈ Z2k+s satisfy
c ≡k+s a · b + ea + eb + eAuth
cˆ ≡k+s aˆ · b + eˆa + eˆb + eˆAuth
and
c ≡k+s
τ∑
h=1
rh · c[h], cˆ =
τ∑
h=1
rˆh · c[h]
a ≡k+s
τ∑
h=1
rh · a [h], aˆ ≡k+s
τ∑
h=1
rˆh · a [h]
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ea ≡k+s
τ∑
h=1
rh · ea[h], eˆa ≡k+s
τ∑
h=1
rˆh · ea[h]
eb ≡k+s
τ∑
h=1
rh · eb[h], eˆb ≡k+s
τ∑
h=1
rˆh · eb[h].
We prove the following two claims can be proven using the same techniques
as in the single and batch MAC checking protocols from Sect. 3, and Lemma 1.
Claim 4. If the sacrifice step passes, then it holds that e := ea+eb+eAuth ≡k 0
and eˆ := eˆa + eˆb + eˆAuth ≡k 0 with probability at least 1 − 2−s.
Claim 5. Suppose that the sacrificing step passes, then all the errors
{δia[h]}h,i/∈A are zero except with probability at most 2−k+log(n·(k+1−logn)).
The previous claim allows us to conclude that eb = eˆb ≡k+s 0, except with
negligible probability. Now we would like to claim that the value ρ ∈ Z2k+s
opened in the sacrifice step is indistinguishable from the one opened in the real
execution. Since in the ideal execution the simulator opens a uniform value,
what we actually need to show is that in a real execution ρ looks (close to)
uniform. Given that ρ = t · a − aˆ mod 2k, this can be accomplished by showing
that aˆ looks uniform to the environment. In order to see that aˆ ≡k+s
∑τ
h=1 rˆh ·
a [h] ≡k+s
∑n
i=1
(∑τ
h=1 rˆh · a i[h]
)
is uniformly distributed it suffices to show
that at least for one i0 /∈ A it holds that aˆi0 looks uniform to the environment,
where aˆi =
∑τ
h=1 rˆh · a i[h] mod 2k+s, and that all these values are actually
independent. This can be shown using the Leftover Hash Lemma by giving a
good lower bound on the min-entropy of a i0 . We proceed with the details below.
Using Claims 4 and 5, we have that whenever the sacrifice step passes it
holds that
−eAuth ≡k ea ≡k
τ∑
h=1
rh · ea[h] ≡k
τ∑
h=1
rh
∑
i/∈A
a i[h] · δib[h].
and
−eˆAuth ≡k eˆa ≡k
τ∑
h=1
rˆh · ea[h] ≡k
τ∑
h=1
rˆh
∑
i/∈A
a i[h] · δib[h].
Intuitively, the only information that the adversary has about the honest party’s
shares is that the sacrifice step passed, which in turn implies that the above
equation holds. Ideally, the fact that this relation holds should not reveal so
much information about {a i}i/∈A to the adversary. Indeed, this will be the case,
which will be seen when we bound by below the entropy of this random variable.
To this end, let m = n − |A| be the number of honest parties and let S ⊆ Zm·τ2
be the set of all possible honest shares (a i)i/∈A for which the sacrifice step would
pass. Notice that in particular, these shares satisfy the equations above and
therefore they are completely determined by the errors that are introduced by
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the adversary. Moreover, since the shares (a i)i/∈A are uniformly distributed in
S, the min-entropy of these shares is log |S|. Additionally, the vectors in (a i)i/∈A
are independent one from each other, hence there is at least one honest party
Pi0 such that the min entropy of a
i0 is at least log |S|m . In the following we show
that ai0 =
∑τ
h=1 rh ·a i0 [h] mod 2k+s and aˆi0 =
∑τ
h=1 rˆh ·a i0 [h] mod 2k+s look
random to the environment.
Let β be the probability of passing the sacrifice step, i.e. β = |S|2mτ = 2
−c
where c = mτ − log |S|. We get that
H∞
(
a i0
) ≥ log |S|
m
= τ − c
m
≥ τ − c.
Now consider the function hr ,rˆ : (Z2)τ → (Z2k+s)2 given by
hr ,rˆ (a) =
(
τ∑
h=1
r [h] · a [h] mod 2k+s,
τ∑
h=1
rˆ [h] · a [h] mod 2k+s
)
,
We claim that this family of functions is 2−universal. Let a ,a ′ ∈ (Z2)τ such
that a = a ′, say a [h0] ≡k+s a ′[h0]. If hr ,rˆ (a) = hr ,rˆ (a ′) then
∑τ
h=1 r [h]·(a [h]−
a ′[h]) ≡k+s 0 and
∑τ
h=1 rˆ [h] · (a [h] − a ′[h]) ≡k+s 0. Given that a and a ′ are
vectors of bits, we have that a [h0] − a ′[h0] = ±1, so we can solve for r [h0] and
rˆ [h0] in the equations above. Therefore, these equations hold with probability
at most 1
2k+s
· 1
2k+s
= 1
22(k+s)
over the choice of (r , rˆ), and hence the family is
2-universal.
According to the Leftover Hash Lemma, even if the adversary knows r and rˆ ,
the statistical distance between hr ,rˆ (X) and the uniform distribution in (Z2k+s)2
is at most 2−κ, provided that H∞ (X) ≥ 2κ + 2(k + s). This is satisfied if we
take κ = 12 · (τ − c − 2 · (k + s)).
Finally, ignoring the event in which the check passes with some non-zero
errors, which happens with negligible probability, the distinguishing advantage
of Z is the multiplication between the probability of passing the sacrifice step
and the probability of distinguishing the output distribution from random, given
that the check passed. This is equal to
β · 2−κ = 2−c · 2− 12 ·(τ−c−2·(k+s)) = 2− τ−2·(k+s)2 − c2 .
Since we want this probability to be bounded by 2−s for any c, we take τ so that
s ≤ τ−2·(k+s)2 , which is equivalent to τ ≥ 4s + 2k. unionsq
7 Efficiency Analysis
We now turn to estimating the efficiency of our preprocessing protocol, focus-
ing on the triple generation phase since this is likely to be the bottleneck in
most applications. We emphasise that the costs presented here, compared with
those of previous protocols, do not take into account the benefits to applications
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from working over Z2k instead of a finite field with arithmetic modulo a prime.
Supporting natural arithmetic modulo 2k offers advantages on several levels:
it simplifies implementations by avoiding the need for modular arithmetic, it
reduces the complexity of compiling existing programs into arithmetic circuits,
and we believe that it will also be beneficial in performing operations such as
secure comparison and bit decomposition of shared values more efficiently than
standard techniques using arithmetic modulo p.
Cost of the preprocessing. When authenticating a secret-shared value
x ∈ Z2k , the main cost is running the vector OLEs, which have inputs over
Z2k and outputs over Z2k+s , when the MAC key α ∈ Z2s . Each vector OLE
requires s correlated OTs on messages over Z2 , where  = max(k+s, 2s), which
gives an amortized cost of s ·  bits for each component of the vector OLE. We
ignore the cost of the consistency check, since this is independent of the number
of values being authenticated.
To generate a triple, we need τ random OTs on strings of length k + s bits,
which cost k + s bits of communication each using [13], followed by τ · (k + s)
bits to send the dj,i values. The parties then authenticate 5 values in Z2k+s ,
which requires generating MACs modulo Z2k+2s for security. Generating these
MACs costs 5 · s · (k + 2s) · n(n − 1) bits of communication using ΠAuth based
on correlated OT, since the vector OLEs are performed with  = k + 2s. The
costs of FRand and the sacrifice check are negligible compared to this, since the
MAC check can be performed in a batch when producing many triples at once.
This gives a total cost estimate of 5s(k + 2s) + 2τ(k + s) bits per triple. Setting
τ = 4s + 2k (to give failure probability 2−s) this becomes 2(k + 2s)(9s + 4k).
Comparison with MASCOT. Table 1 shows the estimated communication
complexity of our protocol for two parties creating a triple in different rings. Note
that like MASCOT [14] — the most practical OT-based protocol for actively
secure, dishonest majority MPC over finite fields — we expect that communi-
cation will be the bottleneck, since the protocol has very simple computational
costs. In the table we fix the computational security parameter to 128, and set
the statistical security parameter to s = 64 in a 64 or 128-bit ring, or s = 32 in
the 32-bit ring, giving the claimed security bounds (cf. Theorem 1 and Claim 5).
Compared with MASCOT, our protocol needs around twice as much communi-
cation for 64 or 128-bit triples, with roughly the same level of statistical security.
Over the integers modulo 232, the overhead reduces to around 50% more than
MASCOT, although here the statistical security parameters of 26 and 32 bits
may be too low for some applications. Note that many applications will not be
possible with MASCOT or SPDZ over a 32-bit field, since here integer overflow
(modulo p) occurs more easily, and emulating operations such as secure com-
parison and bit decomposition over a field requires working with a much larger
modulus to avoid overflow. When working over Z232 instead, this should not be
necessary.
These overheads for triple generation, compared with MASCOT, come from
the fact that our protocol sometimes needs to work in larger rings to ensure
security. For example, for the triple check to be secure, our protocol authenticates
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shares of triples modulo 2k+s, even though the triples are only ever used modulo
2k in the online phase. This means that when creating these MACs with the
protocol from Sect. 5, we need to work over Z2k+2s to ensure security. We leave
it to future work to try to avoid these costs and improve efficiency.
Table 1. Communication cost of our protocol and previous protocols for various rings
and fields, and statistical security parameters
Protocol Message space Stat. security Input cost Triple cost
(kbit) (kbit)
Z232 26 3.17 79.87
Ours Z264 57 12.48 319.49
Z2128 57 16.64 557.06
32-bit field 32 1.06 51.20
MASCOT 64-bit field 64 4.16 139.26
128-bit field 64 16.51 360.44
Comparison with SPDZ using homomorphic encryption. In very recent
work [15], Keller, Pastro and Rotaru presented a new variant of the SPDZ
protocol that improves upon the performance of MASCOT. In the two-party
setting, they show that an optimized implementation of the original SPDZ [9]
runs around twice as fast as MASCOT, and give a new variant that performs 6
times as fast in 64-bit fields; this would probably be around 12 times as fast as
our protocol for 64-bit rings. The original SPDZ uses somewhat homomorphic
encryption based on the ring-LWE assumption, while their newer variant uses
additively homomorphic encryption, and the conjecture that ring-LWE based
additively homomorphic encryption has “linear-only” homomorphism. It seems
likely that both of these protocols could be adapted to generate triples over Z2k
using our techniques. One challenge, however, is to adapt the ciphertext pack-
ing techniques used in SPDZ for messages over Fp to the case of Z2k , to allow
parallel homomorphic operations on ciphertexts; it was shown how this can be
done in [10], but it’s not clear how efficient this method is in practice.
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